Latin America experiences since 2008 a "capital bonanza" related to the expansive monetary policy of central banks in big industrialized countries. Using data from the Enterprise Surveys (The World Bank) of over 8,000 officially registered firms in 18 Latin American countries I examine to which extent buoyant capital inflows into the region between 2008 and 2009 are related to the firms' relative use of informal vs formal financing sources given specific legal-institutional barriers for credit. I find that capital inflows are related to a lower use of informal relative to formal financing. The negative effect is larger with higher levels of banking concentration. The effect of capital inflows on the use of informal financing sources is positive with high start-up costs and low property rights index values.
Introduction
Informal markets are a widespread phenomenon in Latin America. In informal markets people exchange legal goods and services without fulfilling the formal legal requirements of a jurisdiction. Examples are houses without building permits, food without fulfilling sanitary regulation or credit without fulfilling financial requisites as transaction taxes or interest rate caps. Informal credit transactions are done without a bank license, without having reserve requirements at the central bank, without paying taxes or at interest rates without restrictions. The most common informal financing sources in Latin America are family members, private lenders, pawn shops and alike (CAF, 2011, 196) .
How is the decision on financing sources linked to the international macroeconomic environment? Using data on over 8,000 Latin American firms I examine to which extent buoyant capital inflows into the region between 2008 and 2009 affected the relative use of informal vs formal financing sources given relevant legal-institutional barriers for credit.
Capital inflows may influence the relative use of informal vs formal financing sources. With buoyant capital inflows, as it has been the case in Latin America since the zero interest rate policy of the Federal Reserve after 2008, the loanable funds at formal credit markets increase. Such increase in formal credit supply can have different effects. On the one hand it might ease the access to formal credit and thus increase the use of formal finance relative to informal finance. On the other hand, it might motivate arbitrage movements to the informal credit markets. After discussing the theoretical implications of capital inflows for the external financing of firms, I empirically examine the effect of capital inflows on the relative use of informal and formal finance of firms in 18 Latin American countries.
This study can be related to three different strands of the literature. The first one comprises a group of studies which examines the role of the legal-institutional barriers to finance for the financing structure of firms. For these earlier studies the focus on the financing structure of the firms relied on the firm's decisions regarding external vs internal financing. Rajan and Zingales (1998) , for instance, find evidence that financial development reduces the cost for external finance which allows for faster growth of the firm. In markets with less barriers to finance, sectors relying more heavily on external financing sources tend to develop faster. La Porta et al. (1998) as well as Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) emphasize the role of the origin of legal systems for financial development and therefore the possibilities of external financing for firms. They find that a larger proportion of firms rely on external finance in countries with more efficient legal systems.
More recent studies explicitly consider informal sources as part of the possibilities for external financing. By comparing the formal and informal financial sectors in China, Ayyagari et al. (2010) find that only a minority of the surveyed firms use formal finance and that these are the ones with the fastest growth rates. Beck et al. (2008) examine the firm-level and country-level determinants for different types of external financing including informal and formal sources of finance. Using a cross-section dataset for mainly small and medium firms in 48 countries -18 of them Latin American -they find that firm size, financial development, and property rights protection are appropriate predictors for firms' external financing.
The second strand of literature studies the macroeconomic implications of buoyant capital inflows into Latin America with a focus on the role of the (formal) financial sector. Reinhart et al. (1994) , for instance, compare the "capital bonanzas" and the resulting boom-and-bust cycles in 1970s and the 1990s. Calvo et al. (1996) analyse the effectiveness of the different economic policy reactions to capital inflows in Latin America and South East Asia in the 1990s. Ocampo (2009) and Jara et al. (2009) examine the macroeconomic effects of the most recent global financial crises and its crisis therapies on Latin America.
De Paula et al. (2012) examine the macroeconomic consequences of the region's actual "capital bonanza". Gomez et al. (2014) examine the connection between capital (i.e. debt) inflows and the local credit markets in Colombia. They find that declining international capital inflows have a negative effect on the proportion of firms having access to (formal) financial intermediation. They also find that in the long-run capital inflows and the growth of domestic (formal) credit are positively correlated.
The third group of studies explores the macroeconomic effects of capital inflows into emerging economies triggered by the low interest rate and quantitative easing policies in industrialized countries as a response to the latest international financial crisis. Hoffmann and Schnabl (2013, 2014) , relying on an overinvestment framework, provide an explanation of the effects that monetary expansion in industrialized countries can have on emerging economies. They argue that expansive monetary policy in industrialized countries can fuel credit booms in smaller emerging markets.
They focus on capital flows as the transmission channel for the credit booms. Hoffmann (2014) argues that capital inflows into emerging economies triggered by the very low interest rate in industrialized countries have led to financial repressive policies in emerging markets to stem the risk of overheating. This paper offers a connection of the three strands of literature. Specifically I modify the econometric framework of Beck et al. (2008) by using a different database of over 8,000 firms in 18 Latin American countries and by expanding the estimation framework to take into account the role that specific legal-institutional barriers play at credit markets for the financing structure of firms. The main innovation of this study is that I examine how firms' relative use of informal and formal financing is related to the buoyant capital inflows into the region triggered by the zero interest rate policy in the US since 2008.
Legal-institutional barriers in credit markets
To understand the characteristics of the legal-institutional barriers which motivate people to supply and demand capital at informal rather than formal markets, it is useful to consider the characteristics of an ideal market. The essence of markets is to be found in its nature as a competitive order in which individuals voluntarily exchange as legal equals (Vanberg, 2004, 9) . The fact that individuals meet as legal equals implies that the rules under which exchange takes place do not grant privileges to any market participant and that free entry to the market is possible.
Only under such a condition of law equality, the market price system can fulfill its function as a coordination mechanism for individual plans (Böhm, 1966, 121) .
In an ideal financial market anyone with a sound investment project has access to the credit markets and "it will be the quality of the underlying assets or ideas that will determine whether finance is forthcoming, and the identity of the owner (...) will be irrelevant" (Rajan and Zingales, 2003, 9) . Said differently, if N is the total number of entrepreneurs with sound projects in a jurisdiction and θN , with 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1, the number of entrepreneurs who have access to finance, an ideal financial system would require that θ = 1.
Informal financial transactions can be seen as a response of creditors and borrowers to imperfect financial sectors and state interventions (Burkett, 1988) .
Imperfections are present when θ < 1, as the excluded individuals would have incentives to evade regulation and supply and demand capital informally. There are mainly three structural barriers which reflect a low θ at credit markets and have been shown to be empirically relevant to explain differences in access to formal finance: banking concentration (supply side), entry barriers for firms (demand side) and deficient property rights protection (demand side).
The credit supply barriers
The legal-institutional barriers that affect the supply of credit -and therefore represent a low θ -have to do with restrictions to enter the credit markets. They are related to banking concentration and market power of banks (Beck et al., 2004) .
Especially since the turn of the millennium the Latin American banking sector has experienced a process of consolidation and concentration (Rojas-Lopez, 2006; Chortareas et al., 2012; de la Torre et al., 2012) .
In general, high entry barriers for financial intermediaries motivate informal financial transactions in two ways. First, the barriers exclude potential creditors from the legal possibility of supplying capital. Excluded potential creditors are therefore encouraged to seek gains from financial transactions outside the legal-institutional framework. Second, the banking concentration and market power of the incumbent banks benefiting from the entry barriers can ration credit by hardening access to finance for entrepreneurs. The entrepreneurs looking for external financing have an incentive to look for financing alternatives from informal sources.
Supply and demand for credit meet outside the law. Beck et al. (2004) as well as Love and Peria (2012) study the role of banking concentration and banking competition for access to finance. Both studies suggest that market concentration increases firm-reported financing obstacles and reduces actual access to finance. Beck et al. (2004) find that higher banking concentration leads to more firm-reported obstacles to finance for firms of all sizes. In the same sense, Love and Peria (2012) find that high banking competition 2 facilitates access to finance. Higher financial development, measured by the ratio of private credit to GDP, reduces the effect of lower banking competition on financial access.
The credit demand barriers
Entry barriers for entrepreneurs and an unequal enforcement of property rights are credit demand barriers.
When entrepreneurs face high start-up costs in the formal sector, they often decide to produce informally. Informal producers do not appear in the public registries and usually do not register their own operations. They do not use identifiable payment mechanisms such as banking accounts and usually do not properly separate the firm's from the individual's capital (Straub, 2005, 301) . The screening costs for formal credit lenders are therefore prohibitively high. Entry barriers to the formal economy lead to a lower value of θ at credit markets as informal entrepreneurs cannot provide formal banks with the necessary information to resolve information asymmetries. Informal firms therefore lack access to the formal credit markets, even if they have a sound investment project. Informal producers and entrepreneurs owning dead capital are likely to recur to informal financial institutions as informal lenders have a comparative advantage with respect to formal banks. The comparative advantages rely on the enforcements and monitoring mechanisms informal credit suppliers use, which are better fitted to the lack of official registries and accurate collateral of the firms (Ayyagari et al., 2010; Arnott and Stiglitz, 1991; Stiglitz, 1990) .
3 Capital inflows The relative use of informal financing sources The rearrangement, however, depends on which of the institutional barriers for credit (supply or demand) are more prominent and on the firms' relative use of informal and formal financing sources previous to the capital inflows. To understand why, I consider the two possible "corner solutions": a scenario with only credit supply barriers and no credit demand barriers and a scenario with credit demand barriers and without credit supply barriers.
Scenario 1: only credit supply and no credit demand barriers
Without credit demand barriers, with increasing capital inflows firms will increase financing from formal sources.
A scenario without credit demand barriers implies that every firm would have a credit history and that entrepreneurs would not have "dead capital" but all assets would be properly registered and protected by a property rights system. Informal and formal lenders would therefore compete for the same borrowers and informal lenders would not have any screening advantage. As discussed in section 2.1, the entry barriers for credit suppliers due to banking concentration, would be the only institutional barrier keeping formal credit rationed and inducing entrepreneurs to seek informal financing sources.
As credit constrains are eased with the additional availability of loanable funds due to the international capital inflows, firms in general have more possibilities of getting formal financing (Villar and Salamanca, 2005; Villar et al., 2005) . On the one hand, the "bigger" firms are able to substitute formal national with international credit, which frees resources at the domestic banks. On the other hand, the domestic banks have the incentive of supplying credit to the firms which were excluded before the inflows of capital.
Regarding the relative use of informal vs formal financing sources, the effect of the capital inflows depends on the financing structure of firms previous to the capital inflows shock. In general firms can use (i.) only informal, (ii.) only formal or (iii.) a combination of both formal and informal financing sources.
Firms which previous to the capital inflows exclusively used informal sources (i.)
will have incentives to substitute informal with formal finance due to, as mentioned above, the additional loanable funds and the easier access to formal credit resulting form the capital inflows. The relative use of informal vs formal financing will decrease for these firms. The financing structure for firms using only formal financing (ii.) does not change, as they face no incentives to substitute formal with informal financing sources. Firms using a combination of both formal and informal financing sources (iii.) will substitute informal with formal credit as far as the supply-side credit barriers permit it. Therefore, the overall relative use of informal finance would decrease.
All in all, under this scenario in which only supply and no credit demand barriers exist, it can be expected that the higher the capital inflows in a country, the lower would be the informal portion of external finance that an average firm would report.
Scenario 2: only credit demand and no credit supply barriers
Without credit supply barriers, capital inflows would trigger arbitrage movements from the formal to the informal credit markets.
In the scenario without credit supply barriers, there is free entry and perfect competition in the banking sector. Firms would be encouraged to seek informal financing in the first place not because of credit rationing from the banks, but because they would not have the necessary legal registries and collateral to fulfill the conditions required by formal banks. When credit demand barriers predominate, informal and formal credit suppliers do not have the same (potential) clients.
Informal credit suppliers can work as informal "branches" of banks transmitting the additional international capital to the entrepreneurs without access to the formal financial sector.
Additional availability of loanable funds of formal banks would decrease the interest rate in the formal sector and increase the interest rate differential relative to the informal sector. The effects of capital inflows under this scenario also depend on the financing structure previous to the increase in capital inflows. For firms which exclusively used either informal (i.) or formal (ii.) sources, the financing structure does not change as users of informal sources cannot substitute informal with formal finance (due to the demand side barriers) and users of formal finance do not have incentives to switch to informal finance.
For firms using a combination of both sources of financing (iii.) capital inflows can have an effect in two directions. On the one hand, the lower interest rates in the formal sector would motivate firms to substitute informal with formal finance. On the other hand, the larger interest rate differential creates arbitrage opportunities between the formal and the informal credit markets. Arbitrage movements would lower the interest rates in the informal sector leading ceteris paribus to an increase in informal credit. The overall relative use of informal vs formal credit sources by firms would therefore be undetermined.
Summing up, if the supply side barriers are predominant (scenario 1), the relative use of informal vs formal credit sources is expected to decline with capital inflows.
If demand side barriers are predominant (scenario 2), the relative use of informal vs formal credit is undetermined. Therefore the effect of capital inflows on the relative use of informal to formal finance is an empirical question, which I address below. I construct three categories of financing sources given the available information:
(1) formal sources, which include banks and non-bank financial institutions such as cooperatives and microcredit institutions; (2) informal sources, which include supplier credit / customer advance and other sources such as family, friends, money lenders and alike; (3) own sources are internal funding such as retained earnings.
The sum of the three categories equals 100. Since I am interested on the firms which use external finance I do not consider the firms which exclusively use own capital.
The number of firms drops to 8,201.
Given that I am interested in the relative use of informal and formal sources of finance, the endogenous variable is expressed as the percentage of total external finance of a firm i in a country j:
inf ormal f inance inf ormal f inance+f ormal f inance i,j . The share of informal plus the share of formal finance add to 100%. Therefore, an increase in the percentage of external finance from informal sources necessarily implies a reduction in the percentage of formal financing. For that reason, the share of external finance from informal sources can be interpreted as the relative use of formal vs informal finance. The variable is labeled inf ormal from now on.
The variable inf ormal contains two subcategories: supplier credit (supplier) and other informal sources such as family, friends and informal money lenders (other).
I consider supplier credit as an informal source of credit because suppliers are not financial intermediaries and the financial transactions between the suppliers and the firms are not subject to the financial regulation of a jurisdiction. I examine the contribution of capital inflows to the use of each one of these subcategories later on. To estimate the fractional response model Papke and Wooldridge (1996, 621) suggest a quasi-likelihood method based on a Bernoulli distribution. Using the logistic function to specify the Bernoulli log-likelihood function permits a consistent estimation of the Bernoulli quasi-maximum likelihood estimator by an asymptotically robust inference of the conditional mean parameters even if the endogenous variable is not binary. As Papke and Wooldridge (1996, 623) show, the quasi-likelihood estimation method produces consistent estimators and is relatively efficient.
I estimate the following baseline regression:
Following Beck et al. (2008) I include both firm-and country-level variables to capture firm specific characteristics as well as country idiosyncratic elements, i.e. the capital inflows and the legal-institutional environment in which each firm is active.
I present a detailed description of the endogenous and exogenous variables in Table   1 . With the firm-level variables, which are included in the vector X ij of equation 1, I control for the following characteristics as reported for the year 2010: small takes the value 1 if the firm has between 1 and 20 employees and 0 otherwise; medium takes the value 1 if the firm has between 20 and 99 employees and 0 otherwise; age captures the years a firm has been operating in the country; manuf acturing is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the firm's main production activity is manufacturing instead of services and 0 otherwise. 
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The vector Z j includes the country-level variables. As in Beck et al. (2008) That aggregated value represents approximately 170 Billion US Dollars.
As Table 2 assets are on average only 3% over the marginal costs whereas in Peru, the revenues over assets are 38% higher than the marginal costs. The market power of banks in Peru is therefore higher. Unfortunately, the Lerner index is not available for Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua and Uruguay.
In Nicaragua it costs 112% of the country's per capita GNI to start up a firm while in Chile it costs only 6.8%. The property rights index takes values in a range between 0 and 100 where 100 is the most securely protected property rights. The property rights index shows a large institutional heterogeneity within the region.
Venezuela is the country with the lowest value (0) and Chile is the one with the highest value (85). Table 3 provides the summary statistics for the overall sample. The total number of observations is 8201. The number of observations drops when considering the Lerner index due to the missing data on four countries, as mentioned above. In year 2010 the firms from the subsample were on average 3 years older than the firms from the full sample. In the subsample 61% firms were in the manufacturing industry as opposed to 67% in the full sample. All in all, the reduced subsample on average consists of younger firms which are less likely to be part of the manufacturing industry and use a higher proportion of finance from informal sources.
Since the Enterprise Surveys provedie two periods for the panel excercise I consider the first differences of the dependent variables and run an OLS regression.
The reason is that the regression coefficients in the case of a two period panel are identical to the coefficients of a fixed effects estimation. Since I am interested on the effects of capital inflows on the relative use of informal finance, it makes sense to control for time constant heterogeneity by this method. An additional advantage of looking at the first differences is that the distribution of the endogenous variable inf ormal becomes normal and ranges between -1 and 1. A fractional response model is not longer necessary and an OLS regression gives adecuate estimations. 
Results
(8) 0.14 * * * 0.14 * * * 0.14 * * * 0.14 * * * 0.14 * * * 0.14 * * * 0.14 * * * 0.14 * * * The notion that supply side barriers play an important role in the financing structure of firm's in Latin America is confirmed when looking at the variables that capture the legal-institutional barriers (lower part of the Table 5 ). As presented in section 2, the Lerner index reflects barriers to entry in the banking sector and market power of formal financial intermediaries. The results in specifications 7, 8 and 9 show that in countries with a higher Lerner index, firms use on average a higher portion of external financing from informal sources. This result is economically significant in the three specifications and statistically significant in two out of the three specifications. An increase in 0.1 points in the Lerner index would be related to a use of informal financing approximately 1 to 2.3 percentage points higher.
As mentioned above, the baseline regression (equation 1) includes an interaction effect of proxies for the institutional barriers with kinf lows sum. In non-linear regression frameworks, however, marginal effects of interaction terms including continuous variables cannot be correctly calculated. The reason is that the interaction term cannot change without a change in the values of its component terms (Williams, 2012) . It is possible, however, to examine the marginal effect of kinf lows sum at different levels of the institutional proxy. The results regarding the credit demand barriers, however, have to be interpreted carefully. As mentioned earlier, the database for this study does not include unregistered firms. The unregistered firms, however, are precisely the ones directly affected by the demand barriers explained in section 2.2. Therefore the estimation results can only be interpreted as an indirect effect of credit demand barriers on the use of informal finance by registered firms.
As mentioned earlier, the category inf ormal consists of two subcategories:
Supplier credit (supplier) and other financial sources such as friends, family members, informal money lenders, etc. (other). To acquire a more specific picture of the effects of capital inflows on the subcategories of inf ormal, I use the baseline regression framework and separately estimate the effects of the variables on the shares of external financing from supplier and other sources. Table 6 shows the regression results. The specifications 1, 4 and 7 are the same as columns 7, 8 and 9 of Table 5 . The upper part of the table shows the coefficients of the firm-level variables. Specifications 2-3, 5-6 and 8-9 show that, compared to big firms, both small and medium firms rely more heavily on financing from supplier credit than on other sources such as friends and money lenders. The age and the sector (manuf acturing) do not seem to play an important role for the subcategories of informal financing.
The marginal effect of inf lation is negative and statistically significant only for the users of supplier credit. The negative relationship between inflation and capital inflows is therefore mainly explained by the use of supplier credit.
The coefficients of per capita GDP show that firms in richer countries are more likely to use more supplier credit and not necessarily financing from other informal sources. This implies that the general positive correlation between GDP per capita and the use of informal financing sources is mainly explained by the use of supplier credit.
The coefficients of kinf lows sum in specifications 2-3, 5-6 and 8-9 have a larger average marginal effect on the use of supplier credit than on other informal financing sources. Only the effect on supplier is statistically significant in all specifications.
The overall reduction in the use of informal financing sources related to capital inflows is mainly explained by the reduction of supplier credit. An increase of 1% of GDP in the accumulated net capital inflows is related to an average marginal effect All in all, Table 6 shows that the lower relative use of informal sources of finance related with capital inflows can be mainly explained by the reduction in the use of supplier credit. The legal institutional barriers affect both types of informal financing. The average marginal effect of the demand barriers, however, is smaller than the on of the supple barrier. This result can be connected to the fact that the unregistered firms are not included in the dataset, which are the ones more likely to be affected by the demand side barriers. Table 7 shows the results for the fixed effects regression for the panel subsample with 1300 firms. As in the baseline regression, the capital inflows have a negative effect on the relative use of informal sources of finance. The effect is statistically significant in two out of the three especifications. The institutional variables are The results regarding the demand side barriers at the credit markets should be interpreted as an indirect effect on credit markets because the database does not include unregistered firms, which are the ones directly affected by the credit demand barriers. Higher start-up costs as well as a lower property rights index values are related to a higher use of informal financing. These demand side barriers only have a statistically significant effect on the subcategory supplier credit.
Panel Results
The average marginal effect of capital inflows is negative for low start-up costs.
With high start-up costs (over 80% of GNI) the marginal effect is positive and statistically significant. The average marginal effect of capital inflows is positive with low levels of property rights index values (under 30 index points). For property rights level over 40 index points, the effect of capital inflows is negative and statistically significant.
Capital bonanzas in Latin America have rarely ended well (Reinhart, 2013, 7) .
The empirical results discussed above show that on average firms in countries which received higher amounts of capital inflows were able to finance their external capital relatively less from informal sources. At first sight, this might be a desirable result from an economic policy perspective. Capital inflows, however, are also related to macroeconomic risks of overheating and reverse flows. Assuming symmetric effects, capital outflows (as feared with the recently repeated announcements of an increase in the Fed's interest rate) would be related to a more restricted access to formal credit and an increase in the use of informal financing sources.
On the other hand, the empirical results suggest that irrespective of the international macroeconomic situation, high banking concentration, high start-up costs for firms and a deficient protection of property rights are factors related to a higher use of informal financing sources. If Latin American authorities aim less exclusive credit markets and a larger participation of firms in the formal financial
